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A
cheap input as vehicle of diffusion
Due
to the exclusion mechanisms we have been discussing, the appearance
of revolutionary new technologies will not automatically guarantee
adoption from branch to branch and on a world scale. Diffusion
in the early phase demands a simple vehicle of propagation, accessible
to millions of individual decision agents and coherent with their
decision-making criteria. That vehicle is long-term cost effectiveness.
Although many of the products of each technological revolution
can be inaccessibly expensive at first (such was the case with
computers, for instance), at the core of each of these great waves
of innovation there is a key input, which is very cheap, offers
to remain cheap and, in conjunction with a constellation of generic
innovations, radically transforms -in its favor- the relative
cost structure confronting entrepreneurs, managers and engineers[14]
.
Behind
the spread of railways and the steam engine, in mid-19th Century,
there was abundance of cheap coal. Behind the spread of electricity,
heavy chemistry and heavy civil engineering at the turn of the
century, we find the Bessemer and Siemens Martin processes that
made steel as cheap as iron. Behind the spread of asphalt roads
and automobiles, electricity in every home and plastics and synthetics
for every purpose, we find cheap petroleum and technologies that
made energy and petrochemical products less and less expensive.
Behind the present information and telecommunications revolution,
we find ever cheaper and more powerful electronic "chips"[15]
.
In
each case, the key input -or "key factor," as we have termed it[16]
-
represents the new generic technologies in economic terms and
steers engineering and investment decisions towards its intensive
use.
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Diffusion
is self-reinforced
So,
we are suggesting that there are two main reasons why a set of
truly new technologies is able to spread in a world still amply
dominated by the old: First, the exclusion mechanisms have been
weakened by the signs of exhaustion of the prevailing technologies
and, second, there are obvious changes in the relative cost structure,
which are seen to be permanent and act in favor of the new technologies.
So, investment in search of better profits sees a good direction
in which to plunge.
The
process of switching over becomes self-reinforcing through several
feedback loops. The greater the diffusion of its applications,
the greater the demand for the "key factor" which leads to economies
of scale and lower costs, which widens the range of applications.
The more the new technology spreads, the more profitable it is
to set up as a supplier to it or as a distributor, which further
facilitates propagation. The more investment tends to incorporate
the new technologies and equipment, the more the product mix of
equipment producers moves to respond to this new dynamic demand
and the more difficult it becomes to find the old type of equipment
in the market. (This occurs even in consumption, suffice it to
imagine the difficulties experienced by someone in the 1990's
insisting on buying or finding maintenance services for a traditional
mechanical -or even electrical- typewriter). The more consumers
learn about using the products associated with the new technologies,
the easier it is for them to accept the next product or the next
generation of the previous. The more the process of innovation
leads to extraordinary profits and growth in new industries and
firms, the more likely are the waves of imitation, and so on and
so forth.
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A
new paradigm as a quantum jump in potential productivity for all
Yet,
the process overflows beyond the propagation of the key factor
and the growth of the industries related to it. Each technological
revolution generates also a wave of organizational innovation,
which, in synergy with the new generic technologies of widespread
applicability, offers a quantum jump in productivity for all industries,
however old and established
[17] .
The
principles of mass production, which achieved the continuous flow
of the chemical industry for the assembly of identical products,
were first fully developed for the automobile, but they then diffused
across all sectors. Ford's dictum in the 1920's: "You can have
any color, as long as it is black" could still have been applied
to mass charter tourism in the 1960's and 70's. Sloan and Du Pont's
organizational innovations for the corporate structure, with its
many layers, functional departments and divisions were originally
made for their own firms, but they became the model for effectiveness
and efficiency in all industries until very recently. Today, the
adaptability of the Japanese managerial network has been found
to be one of the most appropriate forms of organization to take
advantage of the flexibility of information technology. So, it
is diffusing in more and more sectors and being adopted and creatively
adapted to different conditions locally and globally.
So
each technological revolution brings at the same time a set of
new industries, with a low cost input at the core, and a set of
generic all-pervasive technologies and organizational principles
capable of renewing all the other productive activities.
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A
techno-economic paradigm as an overarching logic for the technology
systems of a period
This
set of interrelated technical and organizational innovations,
gradually comes together as a best-practice model or -as we have
called it, a "techno-economic paradigm" [18]
-
capable of guiding the diffusion of each specific technological
revolution. As it spreads, this new paradigm gradually takes root
in collective consciousness, replacing the old ideas and becoming
the new "common sense" of engineers, managers and investors for
the most efficient and "modern" productive practice across the
board.
Although
for the direct actors this is often largely an unconscious process
in response to changing circumstances, the underlying logic of
change can be observed and analyzed and its common general principles
can be identified. Doing so -and helping change to occur- has
become the business of thousands of consultants in this transition.
What
this means is that each technological revolution establishes an
overarching paradigm as the techno-economic common sense for a
long period of five or six decades. This general logic guides
not only the course of incremental innovations during each period
but also the search for radical innovations and the evolution
of successive and mutually reinforcing new technology systems.
It also guides the upgrading and modernization of existing industries
to bring them into harmony and synergy with the new dynamic industries.
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Difficult
assimilation: The shaping of a paradigm takes decades
The
process we have been describing does not flow easily and it can
take decades. The construction and propagation of a paradigm is
protracted and difficult, due to the many obstacles encountered
in the economic actors themselves and in their environment.
At
first there are the pioneers and the early adopters and they can
go a long way in impressive growth of production and profits.
But they soon encounter the limits to their full development within
the environment of the old paradigm.
One
of the areas of strong resistance to diffusion is found in the
leadership of established firms. It is difficult to believe that
the "normal" way of doing things has become old style and ineffective.
In the table in Figure 2-A, we give an idea of what it means to
change managerial common sense, aspect by aspect, element by element[19]
.
Those who had vast experience in applying the old principles find
themselves forced to learn a new way of thinking and behaving
in order to get optimum results.
THE
NEW vs. THE TRADITIONAL PARADIGM
A RADICAL AND DIFFICULT SHIFT IN MANAGERIAL COMMON SENSE
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CONVENTIONAL
COMMON SENSE
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NEW
EFFICIENCY PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES
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COMMAND
AND CONTROL
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- Centralized
command
- Vertical
control
- Cascade
of supervisory levels
- "Management
knows best"
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- Central
goal-setting and coordination
- Local
autonomy/Horizontal self-control
- Self-assessing/self-improving
units
- Participatory
decision-making
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STRUCTURE
AND GROWTH
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- Stable
pyramid, growing in height and complexity as it expands
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- Flat,
flexible network of very agile units
- Remains
flat as it expands
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PARTS
AND LINKS
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- Clear
vertical links
- Separate,
specialized functional departments
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- Interactive,
cooperative links between functions, along each product
line
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STYLE
OF
OPERATION
|
- Optimized
smooth running organizations
- Standard
routines and procedures
- "There
is one best way"
- Definition
of individual tasks
- Single
function specialization
- Single
top-down line of command
- Single
bottom-up information flow
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- Continuous
learning and improvement
- Flexible
system/Adaptable procedures
- "A
better way can always be found"
- Definition
of group tasks
- Multi-skilled
personnel/Ad hoc teams
- Widespread
delegation of decision making
- Multiple
horizontal and vertical flows
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PERSONNEL
AND TRAINING
|
- Labor
as variable cost
- Market
provides trained personnel
- People
to fit the fixed posts
- Discipline
as main quality
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- Labor
as human capital
- Much
in-house training and retraining
- Variable
posts/Adaptable people
- Initiative/collaboration/motivation
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EQUIPMENT
AND INVESTMENT
|
- Dedicated
equipment
- One
optimum plant size for each product
- Each
plant anticipates demand growth
- Strive
for economies of scale for mass production
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- Adaptable/programmable/flexible
equipment
- Many
efficient sizes/Optimum relative
- Organic
growth closely following demand
- Choice
or combination of economies of scale, scope or specialization
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PRODUCTION
PROGRAMMING
|
- Keep
production rhythm; Use inventory to accommodate variation
in demand.
- Produce
for stock; shed labor in slac
|
- Adapt
rhythm to variation in demand
- Minimize
response time ("Just-in-time")
- Use
slack for maintenance and trainin
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PRODUCTIVITY
MEASUREMENT
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- A
specific measure for each department (purchasing, production,
marketing, etc.)
- ercent
tolerance on quality and rejects
|
- Total
productivity measured along the whole chain for each product
line
- Strive
for zero defects and zero rejects
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SUPPLIERS,
CLIENTS AND COMPETITORS
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Separation
from the outside world:
- Foster
price competition among suppliers Make standard products
for mass customers Arms length oligopoly with competitors
- The
firm as a closed system
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Strong
interaction with outside world:
- Collaborative
links with suppliers, with customers and, in some cases,
with competitors (Basic R&D for instance)
- The
firm as an open system
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A
radical and difficult shift in managerial common sense [File:
LindFig 2-A.doc]
Yet,
this internal resistance tends to be overcome by the threat to
profits and growth from the exhaustion of the old technologies
and practices, together with the increasing examples of success
with the new paradigm and sometimes by the direct pressure in
the market from competitors who have adopted it.
Another
set of obstacles comes from the lack of adequate externalities.
Each paradigm develops in strong feedback interaction with a particular
infrastructural network. The deployment of information technology
propels and is propelled by vast telecommunications systems, which
must be reliable, low cost, powerful and of high capacity and
flexibility. Without that, diffusion is stalled. That same sort
of interaction characterized the deployment of automobiles and
truck transport which both facilitated and were spurred by the
establishment of the networks of roads and fuel distribution services.
And a similar feedback loop takes place in relation to specific
types of related suppliers and distributors, rules and regulations,
trained personnel at various levels, etc.
In
other words, those elements that, when in place, are destined
to generate a virtuous circle of self-reinforced diffusion are,
at first, by their absence, its main obstacles. This is because
each technological revolution must make its way in a world fully
adapted to the requirements of the previous techno-economic paradigm.
So,
as all these changes take place in the economy, many -even most-
of the adaptations and readaptations that the social, cultural
and institutional environment had effected have suddenly become
obsolete and counterproductive. However, this is not visible at
first.
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