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The
process of gradual abandonment of a declining productive model
and of growing adoption of the new, is not readily perceived as
such. The existing institutions take a long time to grasp the
all-pervasiveness of the transformations taking place in more
and more points of the economic system. Traditions, established
routines and past successes with the usual practices make it difficult
to capture the meaning and the threat of these successive changes
as a source of institutional mismatches and problems. The new
technologies are very visible indeed, as were mass production,
plastics and the automobile in the 1920's and 1930's and as information
technologies have been in recent times, but their consequences
take a long time to reach public awareness. Even those who realize
the importance of the technological and economic changes do not
often connect them with necessary adaptations of their own space
of influence or with a need for changes in their own behaviour.
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Institutional
inertia: The upswing delayed
Even
when the need for change is understood, social institutions and
the general framework of socio-economic regulation[20]
have a natural inertia, partly as the result of past successes,
partly due to vested interests. It is only when the diffusion
of the new paradigm has reached a certain critical mass, imposing
its new modernizing logic upon the rest of the productive system,
that both the painful consequences of the process of "creative
destruction" and the obstacles to a full -and beneficial- deployment
of the new potential become fully visible.
Indeed,
the social consequences of each transition are vast and profound,
as is the human suffering. They involve widespread unemployment
[21] ;
the obsolescence of qualifications at all levels; the destruction
of the livelihood of many; the geographic dislocation of people
and activities; the growth of rapid wealth at one end and of growing
poverty at the other, within each country and between regions
and countries[22]
.
(See Figure 3-A)

The Transition Period: Socio-Political Impact of Centrifugal
Trends
It
is then that the social pressure for change is clearly felt; that
the erstwhile effective recipes applied by governments and other
institutions are revealed as powerless and that the need for a
deep institutional renewal becomes more and more self-evident.
But the necessary transformation is not easy nor can it happen
quickly. There ensues an increasingly severe mismatch between
a socio-institutional framework geared to supporting the deployment
of the old paradigm and the new requirements of a techno-economic
sphere brimming with change. Further still, the persistent application
of the now obsolete practices, can actually aggravate the situation
and contribute to a collapse (as was the case with the crash of
1929 and the ensuing crisis of the 1930's).
So,
during paradigm transitions, there are very intense transformations
in technology and the economy and a high level of inertia and
confusion in the socio-institutional sphere. It is this difference
in rhythm of change that leads to the decoupling which we hold
is characteristic of the downswing decades of Kondratiev long
waves. The upswing decades begin as structural coherence is reestablished,
by means of vast socio-institutional innovations, in response
to the requirements of the new paradigm and geared to facilitating
the full transformation in the productive sphere.
Thus,
long wave transitions are processes of "creative destruction,"
not only in the economy, as shown by Schumpeter, but also in the
socio-institutional sphere. The problem is that, in such periods,
institutions face a chaotic and unaccustomed situation, which
requires much deeper changes than the great majority of their
leaders and members had ever experienced. The difficulty is increased
by the fact that there are no proven recipes and change has to
take place by trial and error experimentation under the pressure
of the very high social costs of the techno-economic transformation.
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The
example of the previous socio-institutional framework
Last
time around, to overcome the great depression of the 1930's and
to rebuild the economy after the war, it was necessary to surmount
the prevailing notions about the superiority of free market mechanisms
and accept the establishment of massive and systematic State intervention
in the economy, generally following Keynesian principles. There
is a very impressive list of institutional innovations which diffused
widely in order to foster and regulate the growth of markets for
mass production. At the national level, it goes from the direct
manipulation of demand mechanisms through fiscal, monetary and
public spending policies, to the official recognition of labor
unions, collective bargaining and the establishment of a social
security net, passing through the drastic reduction of the working
week and year. Some of these innovations were made in the post-war
period itself; some had existed before in some countries, for
a short or long time. The important fact is that they were adopted
almost everywhere, with all the variety resulting from vast differences
in social, cultural, historical, political and other factors.
On
the international level, these national arrangements were complemented
by the economic, political and military hegemony of the United
States in the West (holding the Cold War balance with the Soviet
System), Bretton Woods, the United Nations with all its specialized
agencies, the GATT, the Marshall Plan, the IMF, the World Bank,
gradual decolonization and other institutions and measures, geared
to facilitating the international movement of trade and investment,
as well as to maintaining political stability.
Today,
almost every one of these innovations, relatively effective and
widely accepted until the 1970's, is under question. Some have
already been partly or radically modified in one way or another.
Indeed, a successful transition will depend on the establishment
of new rules of the game, regulatory mechanisms and institutions,
adapted to the new conditions. The process of institutional change
has been underway nationally, locally and internationally with
different visions and outlooks. Among the more coherent proposals
there are some that make the explicit connection with the nature
of the present wave of technical change[23]
.
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Long
waves as coupling and decoupling of the system
Summarizing
then, we propose that long waves are related to the internal coherence
of the system. They result from the fact that the techno-economic
sphere experiences vast processes of widespread transformation
and renewal -or changes of paradigm-, about every half century,
which, in order to deploy their full growth potential, require
equally vast changes in the socio-institutional framework. Yet,
the changes in the economy take place at a much faster pace than
in social institutions. The resulting mismatch, which historically
has lasted two or three decades, brings about the "bad times"
(or the downswing of the long wave). When structural coherence
is regained, by a succession of socio-institutional changes which
achieve a good match, then there are two or three decades, which
are experienced as the "good times" (or as the upswing of the
long wave). The process then unfolds as shown in Figure 3-B.
LindFig 3-B The process of creative destruction
in long wave transitions
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