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Having
seen from Sections 1 to 4 that competitive production rests on
a combination of organization, human capital and technology, we
must now look at the ingredient that turns those necessary elements
into actual wealth creation. The competitiveness of the firm can
only bear fruit through success in the market. This in turn depends
on selecting appropriate and realistic market targets. The most
creative and efficient firm will fail if its product is unwanted.
A company in a developing country trying to compete head-on with
a global corporation is not likely to get very far, however much
organizational effort it makes. The new approaches discussed above
can only be useful for reconversion strategies in developing countries
if appropriate market slices are identified by companies, groups
of firms or countries and persistently pursued .
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The
collective dimension of specialization
Another
aspect of knowledge intensive competition is the relationship
between static and dynamic comparative advantages. Whereas the
first can serve as an initial platform, it is the accumulation
of dynamic advantages that determines competitiveness. Whereas
the first can provide a basic cost advantage, only superiority
in technology or managerial competence can guarantee sustained
competitiveness as successive innovations change conditions in
the market. Modern specialization is a direct consequence of knowledge
intensive competition and the greater speed of technical change.
When all technological frontiers are moving, remaining in the
race will often require concentration on one or very few areas.
Firms must specialize in order to focus learning efforts; dispersion
can be weakening.
But
the firm cannot specialize in isolation. To be successful it needs
to rely on interaction with other specialized firms whose capabilities
and core competences are complementary to its own and also growing.
Equally, it must count upon externalities of all sorts, especially
those related to the required types of qualified human resources
and of technical services and information. Consequently, strategic
decisions about specialization are inevitably collective decisions,
especially in countries where resources are too scarce to be squandered.
The
question of how these collective decisions are arrived at is another
matter. Looking at specific cases it certainly does not seem that
they were the result of either pure markets or pure government
decision-making. There are countries where geography or history
have been decisive, as for instance Iceland's specialization in
fishing. In others, institutional arrangements facilitated the
emergence of a consensus strategy, such as that between the Japanese
private and public sectors under MITI's aegis. The specialization
of Silicon Valley in microelectronics appears to have been a spontaneous
phenomenon driven by the advantages of agglomeration around the
first few firms (Hewlett Packard, Intel, etc.) and some of the
best university research laboratories in electronics (in Berkeley
and Stanford). Informal networks are crucial to pioneering industries.
In Chile, the export specialization in fresh berries and salmon
was propelled by the Fundación Chile, a promotional institution
set up by ITT, which not only designed the project but organized
the initial investment, the transfer of technology and the links
with the traders and importers[56]
.
Both in Italy and in Germany provincial governments have worked
together with the local industrial, banking and educational communities
to strengthen and modernize the traditional regional speciality,
be it engineering, clothing or ceramics[57]
.
The city of Rochester in the U.S.A., which already had several
firms working in optics (Kodak, Xerox, Bausch & Lomb), also
arrived at an agreed consensus between the main private and public
actors to turn the city into the world center in optics and imaging
technology[58]
.
The new competition seems to involve a high-tech resurgence of
lost artisan attitudes as well as a revitalization of the advantages
of regional specialization and agglomeration, stressed by Alfred
Marshall a hundred years ago[59]
.
The
routes to specialization are then many and varied. The scale on
which it occurs also has a wide range: a city, a province, a small
or large geographic region or a countrywide network. A strong
focus introduces a bias in the system of innovation, the advantages
of which are obvious to all firms connected with that particular
focus. That is the main point in Porter's argument about the competitive
advantage of nations[60]
:
the accumulation of experience within each firm, the interaction
within specialized networks, the focused research, the concentration
of suppliers and services are powerful externalities for enhancing
competitiveness.
The
free market alone is not likely to lead firms to the sort of long
term efforts and investment necessary to remain in dynamic markets.
It is precisely to help firms compete better that collective specialization
strategies and a consensus on the need to reinforce the system
of innovation, are crucial[61]
.
As Michael Best shows through his analysis of Japan and Northern
Italy, "a healthy industrial sector depends upon combining competition
with cooperation." Competition ensures constant innovativeness;
cooperation ensures long-term competitiveness. The task of the
new industrial policy is to administer this paradox[62]
.
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Turning
static advantages into dynamic strengths: Rescuing the development
value of natural resources
The
issue of strategic specialization brings us to the question of
comparative advantages and whether they are back at the center
or out of the picture as two extreme positions in the debate would
hold. We suggest that in the new circumstances both positions
are right. Alone, comparative advantages such as natural resources
and other static conditions are no longer a basis for capturing
and maintaining market share. But they can become central again
and crucially important to development strategies, when they are
used as a platform on which to build dynamic advantages.
The
new technologies are capable of upgrading and modernizing any
economic activity from mining, fishing and agriculture, through
all branches of manufacturing to finance, distribution and other
services[63]
.
The consequence of this for developing nations and for the firms
within them is that the range of economic activities on which
to base a process of dynamic growth has broadened. All sectors
are capable of becoming technology-intensive. For a long time
"development" was almost synonymous with "industrialization."
Manufacturing was seen as the sole generator of technology and
progress, primary activities seemed to stagnate and the goal of
almost every developing country was to diversify away from natural
resources. In the present context, these notions must be revised.
The time has come to seriously reconsider resource-based, knowledge-intensive
development.
Succeeding
in a strategy of turning simple static advantages into truly dynamic
and competitive ones will not be easy. It involves intense effort
and concentration of local technological capabilities in acquiring
and mastering production technology. This demands equivalent and
simultaneous efforts in organization, training and skills, supplier
development, continuous improvement of products and processes,
effective marketing and technical relations with users. It may
also require the establishment of some sort of institutional mechanism
to bring together all actors in the system, from initial inputs
to markets, in order to develop a consensus strategy and agree
on targets and forms of cooperation. The objective would be to
become as good at exploiting the potential of natural resources
as the Japanese are at electronics[64]
.
Examples
of success in this sort of strategy are the Colombians with fresh
flower exports, the Chileans with fresh fruit and the Malaysians
in palm products and rubber[65]
.
All have made intensive efforts at mastering the complexity of
handling fresh produce for long distance highly demanding markets.
Technology, skills and organization are constantly being upgraded
in agricultural production as well as in post-crop handling, packaging,
distributing and marketing. The latter have sometimes required
audacious business initiatives. In the case of Colombian flower
exports, the resistance of U.S. growers was met by the Colombian
Association of Flower Exporters through a coalition with U.S.
associations of importers, retailers and supermarkets to resist
import quotas. At the same time the Colombians established an
alliance with the affected rose growers for a joint strategy to
promote an overall increase in the sale of roses[66]
.
As
concerns diversification, there can be a clear advantage in building
around natural resources: upstream, to specialized inputs, capital
goods and services; downstream, to greater value added and specialized
products for "niche" markets. The accumulated technical expertise
in the primary product makes for competent users capable of fruitful
interaction with suppliers and clients. The growing synergy that
can result from these networks of technical interaction can benefits
all concerned. Suppliers have demanding customers to specify products
and services together with a trial bed for testing and improving
before eventual export efforts. Downstream producers can count
on the experience of primary producers, with whom they also share
an interest in conducting joint research. Finally, the primary
producers benefit from the bias of the local system of innovation
around their needs and markets. The network thus becomes the basis
for a "positive-sum game" among its players.
The
idea of following a path of advantage enhancement does not exclude
being bold about new options. When building from existing advantages
one can identify possibilities for effectively jumping into frontier
technology. Biotechnology, new materials and information technology
all have vast applicability and can be used as an important additional
source of competitiveness in the development of natural resources.
Biotechnology is an obvious tool for building dynamic advantages
in agricultural activities. It is also useful for managing waste
in mineral processing and even as a mining process, through bacterial
leaching[67]
.
The point being made here is precisely that new hard and soft
technologies are the tools available for modernizing whatever
the chosen economic activity. It just makes sense to choose those
activities where there are static advantages and accumulated experience
as a starting point.
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Market
segment and technology focus
Previous
experience can become the basis for the development of a set of
"core competences" in a well specified direction that can lead
to dynamic advantages capable of increasing and enduring through
time[68]
.
This is all the more important today when firms and countries
are facing much more segmented markets, undergoing frequent technical
change[69]
.
To capture a market position and retain it, firms have to be able
to concentrate their continuous improvement efforts in a precisely
targeted market slice or range.
It
is often said that the new competition involves an increasing
number of non-price factors such as quality, reliability, service,
timely delivery, flexible response and user-adaptedness. But these
features figure in different combinations and with different prominence
depending on the chosen market segment. In a specialized "niche",
quality and user-adaptedness are much more important than price;
for a high volume standard product, timely delivery and price
are crucial for competition whereas user-adaptedness and service
might not even be pertinent in many cases.
Such
variation in the features demanded in each segment imply differences
in emphasis for the building of technological capabilities. Figure
6 shows a summary view of these three very rough types of market
targets and their characteristics for competitive strengths and
technology focus.
Targeting
the high bulk standard segments of the market for any product
(ie. being a so-called "low cost producer") demands a concentration
of effort on the mastery of process technology with a particular
emphasis on reliability and cost reduction through the elimination
of waste in raw materials, capital, idle inventories, flawed products,
by-products, bureaucracy or time.
At
the other extreme, the narrow niche markets require the mastery
of product technology on the basis of highly specialized and constantly
upgraded knowledge and skills, plus very close interaction with
the users.
An
option located towards the middle part of the spectrum is seeking
economies of scope through the multi-product firm operating in
the medium volume segments. These, depending on the industry and
specific chosen range can be characterized by higher or lower
rates of change in models or technical specifications. Competing
in this part of the market demands high flexibility and quick
response to variations in demand in terms of product mix (in volume)
and product change (in specifications). Handling product variety
in this way, which involves avoiding idle capacity through responding
"on line" to demand variations in a range of segments, requires
special efforts in organizational ("soft") technology.
Thus,
the spectrum of options has become wider for almost all product
ranges. This demands strategic decisions on the part of each producer.
The best choice of location on the market spectrum will depend
on many factors including static advantages, the sort of equipment
already in place, the level and quality of accumulated knowledge
and experience assets, the type of existing or potential market
access, etc. There is also the possibility of following a gradual
learning path from easier to more demanding market segments.
Whatever
the choice, remaining competitive and profitable in fast changing
segmented markets demands constant effort. No market position
is safe without continuous upgrading of technological capabilities
and monitoring of the market. This suggests that even the largest
firms cannot remain in isolation. The need to build or join networks,
create consortia for research or other purposes, to link up with
partners for joint training, marketing, product improvement or
other costly activities, to help suppliers and to interact with
clients is inherent in the new conditions of competition. Contiguity
becomes an asset in developing such network.
|
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Networks
and territorial proximity
Proximity
is another element to be taken into account when targeting markets
and selecting a specialization. In recent times, developing countries
that are geographically closer to the most advanced ones have
become the preferred location for foreign investment in export
processing or in lower cost manufacturing. East Asian countries
are being incorporated in successive concentric waves into the
Japanese network[70]
.
Mexico's contiguity with the U.S. favors it as parts producer
for American companies; it also becomes an advantageous location
for Japanese or European companies exporting into the U.S. market.
So the capacity to attract investment as part of global networks
is affected by proximity to core producers or final markets[71]
.
But
this aspect of the proximity issue is in a sense the most traditional.
In terms of the new paradigm, knowledge-intensive competition
in goods and services fosters frequent interaction and direct
human contact in formal and informal networks.
Although
the type of interaction varies in accordance with the market segment
envisaged, being near certain services or suppliers can in some
cases be more important than being close to final markets. So,
the territorial proximity issue needs to be taken into consideration
when targeting markets.
Direct
interaction between final producers and suppliers of intermediate
goods or services is not so important when the final product is
standardized or when the input in question is a basic sort of
material. But, technical change is increasingly affecting the
range of what is considered to be standardized and the practice
of continuous improvement creates the need for direct human contact
for technical networking. An organizational technique such as
"just-in-time"[72]
, for instance, tends to favor a strong long-term relationship
with a small number of chosen suppliers because it depends upon
very quick adaptability and response of the whole chain to changes
in demand. This makes physical proximity of suppliers almost indispensable.
Equally, "total quality" production implies technical interaction
with parts producers in order for the whole system to move towards
zero defects. This direct contact often involves "supplier development"
programs where the core firm invests in improving the technical
capacity of the chosen suppliers. In the case of very specialized
suppliers, direct user-producer links increase the capacity on
both sides of the relationship.
This
has implications for the way to approach specialization. A bid
to take part in global networks as parts suppliers might be difficult
for countries geographically far from the core producer. Next
to labor or other cost advantages, attracting this sort of investment
would also require great ease of communication and movement of
people as well as fluid movement of goods. Physical distance,
the quality of the transport and telecommunications infrastructure
and the reliability of the services all count towards the competitiveness
of suppliers, thus determining the viability of that option.
When
the core of the supplier network is local, as when specializing
in a natural resource, the quality of the domestically provided
goods and services plays an important part in the competitiveness
of the main exporters. This is the case when the large oil or
mineral companies, the agricultural firms or groups of firms in
the developing country, become the core users for supplier networks.
The question then is how to attract foreign and local suppliers
to give effective support to the core activity. For the local
firms, dynamic interaction with the core producers and proven
competence in providing the required goods and services may offer
a protection equivalent to the old tariff barriers. Fostering
the multiplication of these networks as well as the establishment
of universities, research centers, consultancy and other technical
services is part of the process of rescuing the development value
of natural resources. Another aspect of this process is connecting
up with foreign sources of information and technology as well
as creating conditions to attract investment from highly specialized
suppliers. A virtuous circle needs to be unleashed: the stronger
the local system of innovation the more attractive it becomes
for others, thus reinforcing it further.
A
second type of proximity, which overlaps partially with the first,
is between producers and final users. In the new competition user-adaptedness
is an important characteristic of successful strategies. Locating
next to particular key users or in the midst of a large group
of users is an advantage in cases where intense interaction with
clients is a key element in capturing or keeping markets.
This
is obviously the case with customized services but also applies
in a range of other cases: when technology is moving very fast
and users are highly sophisticated (special materials for the
semiconductor industry, for instance); when the main users are
themselves very active in developing the technologies they need
(as tends to happen with fine chemicals); where environmental
factors are essential in determining product or service characteristics
(for example, a pest-control system for a tropical crop); where
market competition is very fierce in terms of quality, adaptability
and functionality (specialized software, for instance) or whenever
technical information for development, adaptation and upgrading
are a key element in customer satisfaction. In many cases this
can be done through a commercial network with technical services
but in others direct contact with production engineering, research
or design might be necessary.
This
again has mixed consequences for specialization strategies in
the developing world. At one extreme, in the high tech sophisticated
"niches" there is considerable restriction for successful entry,
given that the immense majority of sophisticated users are in
the advanced countries. So great care must be exercised when targeting
such niches. One obvious recommendation, when aspiring to relatively
high-tech products, is to target the needs of the local resource-based
industries, when these are -or are trying to become- technologically
dynamic and competitive. Linking up with the Venezuelan oil industry,
for instance, there is growing expertise in digital image processing
services, in certain catalysts and in special chemically treated
perforation muds[73]
.
Analogous examples can probably be found in every country. Other
options may involve partners in the advanced countries or technical
service "outposts" perhaps in cooperation with other firms.
In
contrast to the restrictions encountered when targeting high tech
users, the range of opportunities widens wherever the customizing
or adaptation is related to environmental, cultural or other territorial
factors. This is then the case whenever the local market is the
initial target and its peculiarities define the "niche". In the
case of biotechnology, for instance, Alyson Warhurst has pointed
out the difference between closed and open processes[74]
.
The former take place in an industrial plant or laboratory; the
open processes must be carried out in a particular territory and
be specific to it. Bacterial leaching as a mining process; some
depolluting systems; natural fertilizers, pest control systems,
vaccines for local animal or human diseases and plant or animal
varieties adapted to thrive in specific conditions are some examples
of open processes where interaction with the users in the territory
allows the development of specialized products. Even in consumer-oriented
industries, such as the automobile, global companies locate some
of their engineering design centers with a view to adapting to
the cultural or climatic requirements of a particular region.
This is the policy of Volkswagen in Europe and at least one Japanese
company has declared its intention to set up design centers in
several regions of the world to adapt their product to the market[75]
.
Institutional differences can also be a source of advantages.
The electronic banking systems developed in Brazil adapt to the
specific type of continental-size, country-wide network, peculiar
to Brazilian banks. This gives them an edge in the domestic market
and has helped their exports to other countries with similar banking
structures[76]
.
Thus,
the capacity of the new technologies to adapt to user-needs gives
territorial specificity a more important role to play in defining
market segments. Fostering interaction between competent producers
and final users to identify and develop such segments is an option
to consider when developing patterns of specialization.
|
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| NOTES:
|
| [56] |
See
HUSS,
T., (1991), ECLAC
(1991), and L.
Mytelka
(back
to text) |
| [57] |
See
for example: BRUSCO,
S (1986)
(back
to text) |
| [58] |
GABOR,
A., (1991), pp. 116-126
(back
to text) |
| [59] |
MARSHALL,
A., (1890).
(back
to text) |
| [60] |
On
the notion of competitive (knowledge based) rather than comparative
advantage and its attribution to nations and regions, see
PORTER, M., (1990).
(back
to text) |
| [61] |
In
a document to the World Bank, the Japanese Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund, refers precisely to the fact that markets
mainly reinforce static advantages and to the need for complementing
their working with more directed action. See OECF,
(1991).
(back
to text) |
| [62] |
BEST,
M., op. cit. (Ref. 49), p. 19
(back
to text) |
| [63] |
The fact that the strongest initial impact of new technologies
was on certain areas of manufacturing and services (electronics,
automobile, information, finance, etc.) stems from a combination
of factors, some relevant to the specific conditions of the
pioneering countries and firms, others to the conditions of
the industries themselves, some facing severe problems which
the new technologies could solve, others finding it particularly
easy to take advantage of the new potential. But gradually
more and more branches of industry and more and more activities
in the primary and tertiary sectors are adopting the new paradigm,
both in their production patterns and in their approach to
markets. The all-pervasiveness of information technology and
the widespread applicability of the new organizational "common
sense" give grounds to expect their propagation across sectors.
For a comprehensive review, see MILES,
I., et al. (1988). For applications to specific sector
see WALKER,
W., (1985), and ENERGY POLICY, (1986), HOFFMAN,
K. and RUSH, H., (1984);
MYTELKA, L. (1990) op. cit. (Ref. 4)
(back
to text) |
| [64] |
This
is suggested by Prof. Inohara from Sophia University in Tokyo
when he remarks that "if nations rich in natural resources
were to take advantage of their human resources in the way
that the Asian countries of the Pacific basin have done, the
results could be extraordinary". INOHARA, H., 1991
(back
to text) |
| [65] |
See
LIM's, L., in Mytelka,
L. (1994) .
(back
to text) |
| [66] |
ECLAC,
op. cit. (Ref. 8), p. 70
(back
to text) |
| [67] |
See
CLIVE THOMAS' chapter on biotechnology in agriculture and
Alyson WARHURST's
about minerals, in Mytelka,
L. (1994)
(back
to text) |
| [68] |
About
"core competence" see PORTER,
M. (1985) and PRAHALAD, C. and HAMEL, G. (1990)
(back
to text) |
| [69] |
For
the importance of targeting in a service such as tourism,
for instance, see POON,
A. (1990), and POON,
A., (1992)
(back
to text) |
| [70] |
C.Freeman
has suggested that proximity to Japan or U.S. has influenced
the different outcome of the Asian and Latin American countries.
See FREEMAN,
C. (1991), forthcoming in book in honor of Maizels, Alf,
(1993)
(back
to text) |
| [71] |
Joining
global networks either in "maquiladora" type arrangements
or in another specialized role is an option which needs to
be considered afresh with reference to the new conditions,
even though export processing zones may have had disappointing
results in the traditional framework. This issue however will
not be discussed here.
(back
to text) |
| [72] |
This
system of production, developed in Japan, carries practically
no-inventories but works at the rhythm of demand. It requires
strong links of interaction and trust along the whole chain
of supply, which is simultaneously "pulled" by orders received
at the downstream end. See
SCHOENBERGER, R., (1982) and BESSANT, J., op. cit. (Ref.
21)
(back
to text) |
| [73] |
DAVILA,
E., (1991A), (1991B)
(back
to text) |
| [74] |
WARHURST,
A., ( 1984).
(back
to text) |
| [75] |
AVISHAI,
B., (1991), and GRAVES, A., (SPRU), personal communication
about Nissan
(back
to text) |
| [76] |
CASSIOLATO,J.
(1992)
(back
to text) |
|
|
|
|
|